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Abstract 
This paper attempts to provide answers to the following questions: What 
are the causes of political changes in Africa in the 21st century? Are these 
changes people-led? What are the challenges militating against people-led 
political changes in Africa? The paper takes a look at the nature of the post-
colonial states of Africa since the Cold War with the view to unearthing the 
emerging nature of power shifts in Africa. It analyses the causes, nature, 
and consequences of political change(s) especially since the end of the Cold 
War.  
Key Words: power shifts, political change, social movement, political 
violence, Cold War 
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Introduction 
The 21st century has brought some drastic and dramatic changes in the 
political landscapes in African states. These states have some of the highest 
representation of women in national parliaments in the world today with 
post-conflict Rwanda having about 64 percent [1]. In addition, at least seven 
African countries have had female heads of state or government with Mrs 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf becoming the first elected woman president in Africa 
in 2005. Many countries have seen incumbents lose democratically-
conducted elections in Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Benin Republic, 
and the likes. Mugabe’s nearly four decades old regime came to an end in 
November 2017 without bloodshed against all predictions. There are 
mounting pressures on presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Paul Biya 
of Cameroon who has both spent about three decades in power. As against 
Collier’s prediction that armed conflicts in Africa are always “nasty, brutish, 
and long” [2 p.7], conflicts in Africa (with the exceptions of Somalia and 
South Sudan) have ended in peaceful resolutions. Africa has also shown that 
peaceful political transitions are, in fact, possible with post-election crises in 
Ivory Coast and the Gambia resolved quickly thereby preventing violent 
conflicts. This leads us to the question of the role of the people’s or mass-led 
movement in all these. 
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Due to their influential activities in political mobilisation and participation, 
civic or mass-led movements have become a well-established topic of 
research in political science [3]. Their roles in the diffusion, especially with 
the influence of the social media, have seen the increased and continuous 
questioning and in some cases, bringing down authoritarian and autocratic 
regimes in Africa in the past decade. However, the debate is still on as to 
whether these protests are citizens-led or elite-led for them to make these 
political impacts.   
The past three decades have seen four cross-national waves of anti-regime 
mobilization in different regions of the world: 1) popular opposition and 
regime change in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, 2) the spread of 
popular challenges to communist party rule that occurred in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe from 1989–1991, 3) the “colour” revolutions of 
post-communist Europe and Eurasia 1996–2005, and finally 4) the protests 
between 2010 and 2014, which erupted in thousands of cities in over one 
hundred countries around the world [4]. Further, isolated cases of popular 
anti-authoritarian protest include the Chinese Tiananmen Protests in 1989, 
the Indonesian Student Revolt in 1999, the Saffron Revolution in Myanmar 
in 2007, the Green Movement in Iran 2009 – 2010 and the Chilean students’ 
movement in 2011-2013. A cursory look at all these protests shows that they 
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are elite-driven contrary to what some scholars [5 p.2] have earlier 
maintained.    
As against Skocpol’s classical “social revolution” [6] in his study of 
revolutions in three countries- France, Russia, and China- scholars [7] have 
maintained that authoritarian regimes will hardly permit organised public 
protests that will lead to the citizens questioning its legitimacy will be rare, 
spontaneous, and largely uncoordinated. In that case, it will become so 
difficult for the citizens or the masses to pose a serious threat to the 
authoritarian regimes except they have some support from a faction of the 
political elite either in the military [8] or ruling party [9]. In any case, this 
has been the focus of existing scholarship in political science [10]. In my case, 
I look at the possibility of exploring or expanding the factors that cause or 
promote power shifts under the peculiar conditions in Africa. 
The Idea of Political Change 
Changes take place every day in our lives. We change our minds about what 
to eat; the clothes to wear; the direction we take to work, or even change our 
jobs. In some cases, we do our best to change an unfavourable government 
policy or disrupt the system. Whenever these actions or disruptions causes 
significant alterations in government, public policies, or political 
consciousness among the populace, it is often called political change. 
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But defining it is not as simple as we have said above. Because it is one of the 
most misunderstood and overused terms in political science. The world has 
witnessed great empires, political or ideological systems either imploding or 
exploding. Technology is fast changing political landscapes of several 
societies either from monarchy to republicanism or from authoritarianism 
to democracy. 
Politicians in all parts of the world understand the importance of language 
in politics [11 p.71]. The Nigerian 2015 presidential election was largely a 
contest between the words “Change” and “Transformation”. During 
elections, opposition politicians resort to the use of “Change” in their bid to 
unseat incumbents. The exploitation of the word “Change” for political 
purposes, sometimes makes the idea controversial.  
Before we go on to define the concept, we must note the following points: 
First, political systems and landscapes are always changing. There were 
times in Africa when it was inconceivable for opposition to unseat 
incumbents in elections. There were times, also, when the military was the 
direct opposition to the government in power. Apartheid rule in South Africa 
has given way to “majority rule” since 1994, something considered a sacrilege 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Technology and social media are now playing 
influential roles in shaping political discuss in Africa. The shifts towards 
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democracy and democratization are on track but suffer from several detours. 
Women are playing more prominent roles in Africa today than they were 
decades ago. 
Second, political change is either intended or unintended. Political change is 
a broad concept that includes revolution, regime change, policy change, 
increase in youth and women participation in politics and the likes. 
Therefore, the kind of change a society seeks depends on her level of 
development. African societies may seek to give up “undemocratic” 
monarchical forms of government to multi-party democracy. On the other 
hand, Asian societies may seek democracy through cultural re-orientation 
and transformation. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, many African nationalist leaders were united in their 
bid to stamp out colonial rule. For many of them, like Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana, it was “Seek ye first the political kingdom” [12] and they think “all 
these other things will be added unto you.”  Ghana got independence in 1957 
and energised other African nationalists to continue to demand 
independence. 
Third, political change may often lead to unintended consequences. History 
of Africa shows that political change brings good and bad consequences. 
Nationalists leaders who fought against colonial rule appeared to have made 
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their countries worse off than they met it. The return to democracy after long 
years of military rule did not always bring “democratic dividends” to the 
people who were made to believe things will get better once the soldiers 
return to the barracks. The breakaway of South Sudan from Sudan did not 
come with the peace and better life it promised. Many Nigerians who 
celebrated “Change” of government after the 2015 presidential election got 
backlashes from those in favour of “Transformation”. Till date, there is still 
heated disagreement about the impacts (positive or negative) of the 
“Change” in Nigerian society. 
Forth, some political changes matter than others. Increase in women or 
youth participation in politics may be taken for granted in many African 
societies but major constitutional reforms or regime changes may be 
considered “major”. While voting with technology is almost like an everyday 
reality in Western democracies, electronic voting is still viewed with 
suspicion in Nigeria with fears of rigging and distrust for electoral 
institutions being so strong. 
After looking at all these, we can see political change as the transformation 
of political systems, structures, institutions, values, objects, actors or 
processes over a period of time. Some scholars [13 p:9] see political change 
as essentially caused by economic factors while others argued it is caused by 
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other reasons like social conflicts, political culture and prevalent political 
ideas [14 p. 441]. Scholars like Felix Kolb [15], for example, defines it as 
“outcomes that are related to the state and changes in its policies, politics, 
and polity.”  
Although Kolb [16]’s definition extends the concept of political change 
beyond just institutional or policy changes, it excludes non-institutional 
changes like changes in public opinion or public political consciousness that 
occur as a result of intense political activism, economic downturns, heavy 
social protest and the likes. The non-institutional political changes are also 
important because they can influence the way citizens perceive and interact 
with their political institutions, objects and actors. By fostering the 
development of a citizenry that is willing and able to claim a greater stake in 
politics, these non-institutional changes can transform the relationship 
between the state and society [17 p.30]. 
By changes in political consciousness, we mean “ongoing, dynamic process 
of constructing one’s understanding of, and relationship to,” [18 p.7] the 
political world. 
Political Change in Africa Since the Cold War  
Aside colonialism, the Cold War has influenced African politics than any 
other thing. The internal affairs of most, if not all, African states have been 
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shaped by the ideological conflicts between the United States and USSR, the 
two key warriors in the Cold War. This may be because many African 
countries gained independence in the peak of the Cold War 1960s and 1970s 
which looks like an opportunity for the superpowers to increase their spheres 
of influence. Due to their fragile, vulnerable, and volatile nature, many 
African countries looked up to some superpowers for their leaders to 
consolidate their powers [19 p.126].  
The intense search for spheres of influence created the quest for African 
clients the superpowers support and sustain many undemocratic regimes. In 
turn, these regimes in their increasing level of unpopularity resorted to brute 
force, violence, intimidation, and in many cases, the assassination of the 
opponents of the regimes. Civil society organisations, opposition political 
parties and groups were outlawed as these regimes hoped to strengthen their 
grips on power relying heavily on their superpower allies.   
During this period, African states began to take multiple personalities partly 
manifesting characters of their own and those of their ex-colonial masters. 
This identity crisis occurring as a result of the multiple personality 
syndromes soon reveal they have inherited state institutions which they 
barely understand. They were understandably fragile, and in some cases, 
economically unviable. The fragilities in these states soon became obvious 
11 
 
and were exposed to several lights: Newly-independent Congo soon became 
caught up in a long and bloody conflict in which approximately 5 million 
people have died as a direct or indirect consequence of the conflict, making 
this the bloodiest war since the Second World War [20]; Egypt and Togo 
were soon to witness military coups and these became a fashion in virtually 
all African countries; series of events led to the collapse of democratic 
institutions in 1966 and subsequently, a bitter Nigerian Civil War; bloody 
wars of liberation took place in Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and many others; and  Liberia and Sierra Leone will later endure 
long and bloody ethnic conflicts. 
With more African countries gaining independence, former nationalist 
movements took over state institutions in their respective countries. These 
nationalist parties soon became dictatorial, ruthless, and corrupt [21] in their 
bid to stay in power. The soldiers that have earlier accused politicians of 
corruption, mismanagement, maladministration, and fraud soon became a 
reincarnation of the vices they claimed to correct when they took over in the 
first instance [22]. Many nationalist parties have become so synonymous 
with their countries’ liberation that their leaders find it difficult for them to 
be defeated. The nationalist leaders having seen the perquisites of state 
power did not wish to leave office or function on a multi-party basis allowing 
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for free and fair elections in their realms. Leaders like Algerian Marxist 
Socialist President Ahmed Ben Bella who himself fought fiercely against the 
French in his bid to “liberate” his country, soon became ruthless and 
dictatorial. He outlawed all opposition to his newly-formed regime in 1961. 
His regime was overthrown in 1965 by a military coup. This same fate befell 
many of such leaders at the time. 
In the 1980s, there was only one case, Mauritius, of peaceful democratic 
transition of power in sub-Saharan Africa. Aside from that, dictators reign 
supreme in African capitals with little or no effort to relinquish power 
anytime soon. Those who succumbed to pressures of leaving office peacefully 
hurriedly conducted sham elections to legitimize their “anointed” candidates 
as successors from their own parties to guarantee them peaceful retirements 
[23]. 
The Cold War finally ended in 1991 with the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union and the Berlin Wall. These also have had their consequences on the 
changing patterns of African politics.  
The end of the Cold War came with increased democratisation, competitive 
elections, multiparty democracy, the decline of the communist ideology and 
parties in Africa and the increase in the demands for human rights, social 
justice, and liberal democracy. In Zambian 1991 presidential election, 
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Marxist leader, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, and his part the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) lost to Frederick Chiluba’s Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD). 
Between 1991 and 1996, there were 20 changes in governments and parties 
in power in 12 sub-Saharan Africa countries [24]. The 1980s and 1990s also 
saw increased popular oppositions to military regimes in several African 
countries and the demands for transitions to democratic rule. The Apartheid 
regimes in South Africa began to collapse as majority parties took over in 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa effectively ending several years of 
violent strife.  
Between 1989 and 1997, about three out of every four African countries had 
adopted multiparty elections [25 p.11]. Said Adejumobi [26] observed four 
noticeable patterns in the democratization wave in Africa in the 1990s which 
include: first, the rising influence and demands of civil society and human 
right organisations for democracy on the political elites which the later 
concede to; second, the rising number of state-coopted civil society and 
human right groups who also demands change and democratization from the 
political elites; third, the declining motivations for the state to resort to 
violence to crush popular oppositions hence decides on its own to transition 
to multiparty elections; and fourth, the waves of state-sponsored social 
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conflict deliberately created to derail political transitions like the case of 
aborted Nigeria’s Third Republic. In the four cases highlighted above, except 
when civil society is able to exert itself and force the state to concede, the 
transition to democracy resulted in cosmetic exercises for the military ruling 
classes to gain legitimacy. Many of the political elites who decided to adopt 
democracy did so tactically to avoid full reform programs [27]. As a result, 
many African countries had what we can call cosmetic civil rule as a result of 
the incomplete transition. In this case, we have civilian institutions but in 
reality, weak states which are degrading quickly [28]. Furthermore, the so-
called transitions left executive powers unaffected or in many cases, stronger 
[29]. Today, what most African countries experience can at best be described 
as “hyperpresidentialism”, in which executive powers of the President dwarfs 
all other organs of government [30]. 
As the millennium winds down, many African countries either fully or 
partially succumbed to the pressures from civil societies, human right groups 
or international organisations. President Quett Masire of Botswana stepped 
down voluntarily in 1998 after ruling the country for 18 years. He handed 
over to his deputy, Festus Mogae. The political transition programme that 
started finally led to the handover of power to civilians in 1999 in Africa’s 
most populous country, Nigeria. The soldiers were down but not out yet. One 
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of them, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, was elected as President even though he 
himself was military head of state between 1976 and 1979. Many generals 
who served in the late General Sanni Abacha and wanted him to continue 
under a dubious transition programme earlier in 1995 have formed their own 
party, All Peoples Party (APP).   
As a result of the experiences of many years of military dictatorship, the 
seemingly antagonistic relationship between the civil society and the state, 
heavy rigging of elections, weak democratic institutions, it was clear that the 
newly-elected post-military civilian administrations have not given up their 
military instincts of violence. Elections are rigged in favour of the ruling 
parties with reckless abandon. In some other cases, election results are 
nullified as it was the case of Yahya Jammeh who lost his bid to be re-elected 
President of The Gambia in December 2016 but chose to annul it citing “some 
irregularities” after initially congratulating the winner, Adama Barrow. In 
some cases, institutions are manipulated to do the biddings of the parties in 
power. Court Judges who refused to do the biddings of the ruling parties are 
either sacked, molested, cajoled, blackmailed, or intimidated into 
submission. Opposition leaders are arrested, intimidated or assassinated in 
the case of Ivory Coast in the early 2000s. Opposition parties, civil societies, 
are bribed with promises of “juicy appointments” in government. Since many 
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opposition parties are often weak financially and lacking in funding to 
compete favourably with their ruling rivals who have unfettered access to 
state funds, the offer to partake in the “national cake” is too tempting to 
ignore [31 p.162-3]. This was the case of the deal-making under the guise of 
National Unity Government which opposition leaders were allocated some 
“juicy” positions like prime minister or some senior ministers in government 
in  Kenya (after the 2007 elections), Zimbabwe (after the 2008 elections) or 
Nigeria (after the 2007 election) [32].     
Having shown that much progress, the question of who or what directs these 
changes then arise. Some [33] have argued that the change is “mainly coming 
from citizens themselves. Maybe they have just lost patience with corrupt 
dictators.” While, as some scholars [34, 35, and 36] might have argued that 
those “who take part in civil disobedience or political violence are 
discontented about something” within African contexts especially, it is 
difficult to show that any protests or political mobilisation can take place 
effectively without the support of some members of the political elite who 
may either subtly provide the resources for the organisation or overtly being 
part of the movement. The weakness in this theory is that it tends to reduce 
collective actions to individual behaviours which are not always the case. 
These theorists may argue that the resignation of Mugabe’s Zimbabwean 
17 
 
president deals primarily with the “anger” of the people against his regime, 
but in fact, the opposite may be the case. The swearing-in of his former 
deputy, with whom he earlier had a political disagreement, who has been in 
power with him for 37 years shows that the movement was primarily elite-
based. It is difficult to prove that the pockets of protests against him on social 
media by the youths could have accounted for his fall. At least, their 
expressions of these “anger” did not transform into meaningful political 
actions that immediately threaten the regime until his disagreement with his 
erstwhile deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, became public. We, can, as in the 
Arab Spring, grant that “the wider availability of information about what 
corrupt leaders are–and are not–doing, and awareness of what is happening 
in neighbouring countries, looks like a growing factor.” [37]. 
As we have seen above, political changes that have taken place either through 
military coups or elections, there have been significant contributions civil 
society organisations, pressure groups or interest groups directly or 
indirectly connected to political elites. In the next section, we shall be looking 
at some more specific instances of elite-led movements.  
Discussions:  Accounting for Power Shifts 
In our review of power shifts in Africa, we noticed that there are some 
recurrent themes which include: regime changes, improved women and 
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youth participation in politics, decline in post-election violence, and 
relatively improved confidence in electoral democracy. In this section, we 
shall be taking a look at the key factors underpinning these themes. 
Cultural Changes 
Africa comprises societies that are firmly rooted in strong tradition and 
cultures dating back to pre-colonial times [38]. Incremental changes in these 
cultural beliefs, especially in technology, have had lasting impacts on her 
political life. These “Incremental changes” are what Frazier [39 p.31] sees as 
including technology, customs, habits, values and resulting personality.  
With significant “culture contacts” [40] much of other cultures have been 
incorporated into Africa societies. This was what led Linton [41] to contend 
that diffusion of cultures creates changes as a result of the rippling effects of 
the changes taking place in other lands. There were strong indications that 
the military coup in Egypt in the 1950s provides the wave of the fashionable 
trend of military coups that swept through Africa, and in West Africa through 
Togo.  
Also, we can argue that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe that 
led to democratization provided a strong impetus for the demands by African 
intellectuals for liberal democracy. We can also justify the earthquake of 
democratic transitions through the ballot box especially in West Africa with 
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the Senegalese and Ivory Coast elections in 2012 where opposition 
candidates became victorious. 
When The Gambia president, Yahya Jammeh refused to step down 
peacefully after losing the country’s presidential election in November 2016, 
West African leaders under the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) quickly intervened to avoid bloodshed which may spread quickly 
to neighbouring states through Senegal. It was also possible that, had the 
leaders not intervened early enough, such practice may soon become the 
fashion in the sub-region with Ghana election just a few months away. 
Another aspect of changing cultural patterns in Africa is in the increasing 
influence of social media.  
Technology is an aspect of culture just like customs, habits, and values. So, 
any change(s) in technological innovations automatically brings about 
changes in political culture in societies. Political culture itself is a subset of 
national or subnational culture. Technology is part of a culture. 
Technological changes bring about changes in political culture and political 
consciousness [42]. 
Social media, a recent invention in the world, is fast becoming an essential 
source of civic activism and engagement. This is why it must be studied for 
its own uniqueness. It functions through its platform comprising of 
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Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other social websites. It got the influence to 
transform the methods through which political as well as social activities are 
prepared and implemented. 
Political landscapes are fast changing in several places thanks to the 
influence of social media. The earthquake of political changes brought about 
by the “Arab Spring” explains the changing nature of protests and political 
activism brought about by social media [43]. 
Inspired by the Arab Spring mobilisations, Nigerian citizens organised 
themselves for a showdown with the government in January 2012 over the 
rumour gaining grounds that it was launching a full-fledged deregulation of 
the downstream sector of the economy. This led to a series of a week-long 
protest against neo-liberal reforms in the country. 
While it is still disputable how as to whether social media and not, other 
factors are responsible for the changes brought about by online activism, the 
role of social media in political mobilisation is still being studied by scholars. 
Going through developments in Zimbabwe, it is highly contestable as to the 
influence of hashtags on the power shift in November [44]. 
In Nigeria for instance, the attraction of the youths to social media has been 
one of the key strategies for youth groups to mobilise them for political 
participation and engagement. These have brought significant results. The 
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#NotTooYoungToRun and #OccupyNigeria movements are social media 
initiatives which heavily attracted youths to the need to get involved in 
politics in Nigeria.       
Changes in Demography 
Population patterns have the capacity to transform societies. There appear 
to be profound changes taking place in African population today. According 
to an AU [45] report, State of Africa’s Population, the population pyramids 
of the various regions of Africa generally show that Africa’s population is 
largely young and one of the youngest in the world. The report claims that 
about 40% of Africa’s population is under 15 years an average for all its sub-
regions [46]. Also, according to UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
in its 2014 report, claims that “Africa is a continent of young people with 65 
percent of the population below the age of 35 and nearly 50 percent under 
the age of 19.” 
Also, according to World Bank data cited in UN Population Fund report [47] 
shows that African children have ‘higher poverty rates than adults in the 
poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa, with more than half of children 
living in conditions of extreme poverty. In many countries, access to and 
quality of education remains low.  According to UNESCO, 22 million of the 
69 million eligible adolescents in the world that did not attend secondary 
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school in 2011 lived in sub-Saharan Africa.  35.89% of adolescent girls are 
not in secondary school in sub-Saharan Africa, compared to 7.39 in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. While 30% of youth aged 15 to 24 worldwide 
were considered “digital natives” in 2012 (five or more years of online 
experience), under 10% qualified at this level in sub-Saharan Africa.’ 
Looking at the data above, we can see that the youthfulness of African 
population which has been negatively affected by the disease, poverty, 
hunger, migration in search of greener pastures, unemployment and the likes 
have the potentials to ensure power shifts. These may also be exploited by 
some members of the elite for some political advantages. 
The Role of Ideas 
African societies are no strangers to the power of ideas. Many of her early 
nationalists have travelled to study in Europe and America and have 
imported some of their ideas. Weber [48] argued that the development in 
Western Europe was largely due to the influence of ideas of work ethics 
introduced by early Protestants.    
The intellectual ideas of Frantz Fanon especially his The Wretched of the 
Earth and Black Skin, White Masks reportedly influenced anti-colonial 
struggles in Africa and Latin America in the 1960s, 1970s and in Southern 
Africa in 1980s and 1990s. 
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University students across Africa played key roles in the demands for the 
return to democracy; campaign against human right abuses; decolonisation; 
an end to dictatorships. The National Association of Nigerian Students 
(NANS) in collaboration with civil society organisations were at the forefront 
of the campaign to return to democracy in the 1990s [49].  
Changing Frequencies of Violent Conflicts 
The word “conflict” appears to have become synonymous with Africa as used 
by Western scholars. Some scholars like Collier [50] have raised concerns 
that Africans “might die in one” conflict or the other. But contrary to Collier 
and theorists of his school of thought, evidence shows that wars are on the 
decline in Africa and there are great prospects for peace since the 200s (51, 
52, 53, and 54]. 
As against many expectations, there were peaceful political transitions in The 
Gambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Benin Republic, Zimbabwe, and several other 
countries where incumbents were defeated. Even though there were serious 
concerns over tenure elongations in Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda in 2016, 
post-election conflicts were either short-lived or largely averted. It is still 
uncertain if the post-election tensions in Kenya will degenerate into full-
blown ethnic conflicts between the Luos and Kikuyus. All these show that 
these countries are achieving high degrees of stability. 
24 
 
Conclusion 
So far, we have looked at power shifts in Africa and how they came about. 
Looking at the patterns of the power shifts, it is clear that they have been 
elite-led, rather than people-led. The challenges to the achievement of a 
people-led movement for power shifts can be traceable to the nature of the 
state which lacks civil society orientations.  
As the recent case of Zimbabwe shows, power shifts have been led by the 
political elites with the support of the people. This should have been the other 
way round.  
If the current tempo is sustained in the digital age, the prospect of having a 
youth or people-led movement to achieve power shift in the nearest future is 
bright.  
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